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Abstract
This position paper considers the privacy and security impli-
cations of EUI-64-based IPv6 addresses. By encoding MAC
addresses, EUI-64 addresses violate layers by exposing hard-
ware identifiers in IPv6 addresses. The hypothetical threat
of EUI-64 addresses is well-known, and the adoption of pri-
vacy extensions in operating systems (OSes) suggests this
vulnerability has been mitigated. Instead, our work seeks to
quantify the empirical existence of EUI-64 IPv6 addresses
in today’s Internet. By analyzing: i) traceroutes; ii) DNS
records; and iii) mobile phone behaviors, we find surpris-
ingly significant use of EUI-64. We characterize the origins
and behaviors of these EUI-64 IPv6 addresses, and advocate
for changes in provider IPv6 addressing policies.
1 Introduction
The privacy and security implications of Layer-2 hardware
network identifiers, e.g. 48-bit IEEE Media Access Control
(MAC) addresses [2], have been well-studied. In particular,
because these addresses are static, difficult for the average
user to change, and persist across network attachment points,
they can be exploited to both fingerprint devices (e.g. identify
the manufacturer and model [8], thereby permitting targeted
attacks) as well as compromise user privacy by providing a
persistent tracking identifier.
This work focuses on MAC addresses in IPv6. Auto-
configured IPv6 addresses were traditionally formed by en-
coding the interface’s 48-bit MAC address as an EUI-64 [4]
into the lower order bits of the 128-bit IPv6 address as part of
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [14]. Today,
however, modern OSes randomize the host bits of their IPv6
addresses according to the privacy extensions standard [9].
These addresses are randomized and highly ephemeral [11].
Most recently, two works at the ACM IMC 2018 discover
non-trivial numbers of EUI-64 addresses within large-scale
IPv6 topology discovery campaigns [5, 7]. This unexpected
result is due to the fact that while end-hosts have largely
abandoned the use of EUI-64 addresses, Customer Premise
Equipment (CPE) infrastructure (e.g. home routers and gate-
ways) still make extensive use of such addresses. Critically,
the MAC addresses of these devices is revealed remotely
when they respond to traceroute probing.
While revealing these addresses is seemingly innocuous
at first blush, they introduce two potential vulnerabilities: i)
the ability to identify the manufacturer and model of a de-
vice, thereby permitting targeted attacks; and ii) the ability
to track users despite efforts to prevent such tracking. More
specifically, not only are the host bits of a client’s IPv6 ad-
dress ephemeral, their allocated network prefix is similarly
ephemeral [10]. Indeed, many providers induce their client’s
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to change regularly for privacy rea-
sons [3]. However, while the client’s end-host IPv6 address
is changing, the address of her home gateway is not – thus
an attacker able to perform traceroutes to the client can deter-
mine that it is the same client, and track the client’s assigned
addresses over time.
In this preliminary survey, we study the use, prevalence,
and potential vulnerabilities of EUI-64 addresses among four
separate sources of data:
• CAIDA Archipelago traceroute data from December
2008 to July 2018
• Traceroutes to RIPE nodes conducted in 2018
• ANY and AAAARR lookups fromRapid7’s fDNS data
set between October 2016 and December 2018
• Inspection of 27 mobile devices in a lab environment
2 Infrastructure EUI-64 Prevalence
Plonka and Berger report that fewer than 1% of clients ac-
cessing a large CDN in 2015 via IPv6 use addresses contain-
ing EUI-64 MACs [11]. While the population of clients with
EUI-64 addresses is small, recent work found non-trivial
numbers within IPv6 infrastructure [5, 7]. We first analyze
the macro composition of two large public datasets.
The CAIDA traceroute data [6] contains 3,650,488 unique
MAC addresses appearing in 5,794,444 distinct EUI-64 IPv6
addresses between December 2008 and July 2018. Between
the months of October 2016 and December 2018, Rapid7’s
fDNS dataset [12] contains 50,060,121 AAAA records with
an EUI-64 address, with 7,705,481 unique EUI-64 IPv6 ad-
dresses containing 2,177,516 distinct MAC addresses.
The distribution of EUI-64 IPv6 addresses is non-uniform;
some autonomous systems (AS) are home to far greater num-
bers of active EUI-64 addresses than others. Over 2.8 mil-
lion EUI-64 addresses appear in the CAIDA data from one
provider’s prefixes, whereas only dozens appear in other net-
works. This appears to be indicative of the manufacturer of
the prominent CPE devices issued by the respective service
provider. The most common providers and manufacturers
discovered in the CAIDA data are highlighted below:
Providers 1 Manufacturers
AS A (50%) Actiontec (57%)
AS B (11%) AVM (FRITZ!) (14%)
AS C (9%) Arcadyan (8%)
AS D (6%) Huawei (6%)
AS E (5%) ZTE (3%)
3 Tracking users over CPE Address Changes
To highlight tracking and privacy implications of CPE-
based EUI-64 usage we conduct a longitudinal IPv6 tracer-
outes to fixed nodes. We fetch the set of RIPE Atlas
nodes [13] with working IPv6 daily, recording their address
and Atlas node identifier. The node identifier allows us to
continually probe the same end node over time, even if its
address changes. We traceroute to each node and find the
penultimate address when the traceroute reaches the des-
tination. In this fashion, we can determine when service
providers change the address of the link between the provider
and the customer’s CPE. We are particularly interested in
cases where the service provider changes the assigned CPE
prefix, but the CPE’s address is EUI-64.
These prefix changes, assumedly meant to provide privacy
protections, are trivially enumerated due to the CPE device
responding to network probing using an EUI-64 derived ad-
dress. Furthermore, and of particular concern, this behavior
allows for the potential to track client devices, even those
using ephemeral addresses, as an implicit association to the
CPE’s EUI-64 address can be inferred via the derived net-
work path. Depicted below, traces to the same unique host
over the course of a month, illustrate a representative behav-
ior in which the CPE device consistently flips between two
/48 but distinct /64 IPv6 network prefixes on a daily basis.
Date CPE IPv6 /64 Prefix2
20181024 xxxx:xxxx:xxx1:1676
20181025 xxxx:xxxx:xxx2:46e1
. . . . . .
20181102 xxxx:xxxx:xxx1:a6d7
20181103 xxxx:xxxx:xxx2:c9b9
Other providers assign new /64s within the same /48 every
day, while we even observe CPEs being assigned prefixes in
1ASNs anonymized
2IPv6 prefixes anonymized
different /16s owned by their provider.
Conversely, we detect single MAC addresses appearing in
EUI-64 IPs spanning multiple ASNs and countries in tracer-
outes occurring within a short time interval. In this case, it
is unlikely that there is a single device traveling to disparate
locations. Rather, we posit that these devices auto configure
to a default hardware address, or represent devices that have
inappropriately reused a MAC address.
4 Mobile Phone Behaviors
Support for privacy extensions has been available since
iOS 4.3 and Android 4.0 [1], suggesting that privacy con-
cerns have long been addressed on mobile devices. While
all 28 mobile device models, produced by 12 manufactur-
ers, that we tested implemented privacy extensions for the
primary IPv6 address, only the OnePlus 6 running Android
8.1 had only privacy extension addresses. All 27 other mod-
els, covering Android 4.3 to 9.0, had secondary, global EUI-
64 addresses assigned to their interfaces. Interestingly, this
EUI-64 address was not always visible from the system set-
tings application; instead, we connected to each phone using
the Android Debugger and used the IPv6 addresses discov-
ered via the debugger as ground truth.
After obtaining each device’s EUI-64 IPv6 address (ex-
cept the OnePlus 6), we successfully elicited an ICMPv6
Echo Response from each of the devices in response to an
Echo Request addressed to its EUI-64 IPv6 address while
connected to an 802.11 wireless network. Early experiments
involving Google Pixel phones connected to LTE networks
suggest the ability to ping6 EUI-64 IP addresses on mobile
devices on cellular networks, as well. This implies a poten-
tial to track individual devices, and hence users, as they move
across networks. For example, an adversary who knows the
MAC address of her target might deduce a range of network
prefixes the target might be in; exhaustive probing of these
prefixes with the lower bits set to the EUI-64 generated by
the target’s MAC address quickly confirms or rules out that
device’s presence.
5 Future Work
A more robust quantification of service provider-induced
network prefix changes utilizing our EUI-64 CPE address
tracking mechanism remains in progress. Lastly, we hope
to investigate the plausibility of the EUI-64 targeted attack
described above, in which a priori knowledge of mobile de-
vice’s MAC address is assumed.
6 Disclaimer
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